Decisions in the environmental and in particular the climate domain are burdened with uncertainty. Here, we focus on uncertainties faced by individuals when making decisions about environmental behavior, and we use the statistical sampling framework to develop a classification of different sources of uncertainty they encounter. We then map these sources to different public policy strategies aiming to help individuals cope with uncertainty when making environmental decisions.
Uncertainty in the environmental domain
Decisions in the environmental domain are often burdened with uncertainty, at both the institutional and the individual level. Here, we focus on uncertainty faced by individuals when trying to decide about environmentally relevant behaviors. To prevent further climate change, should they be turning out lights, reducing car use, reducing air conditioning and heating, using energy-efficient appliances, buying green energy, or recycling? While all of these behaviors are helpful, their relative effectiveness depends on a number of known and unknown factors. Unlike in decisions under risk, where probabilities and values of outcomes of different actions are known and the best course of action can be calculated, in the presence of uncertainty probabilities, values, and even the full range of future outcomes are not known (Knight, 1921) .
In this paper, we sought to develop a simple sampling framework to identify and understand different sources of uncertainty affecting individuals when making decisions in the environmental domain and to map these sources to different public policy strategies aimed at helping general public to cope with uncertainty. The sampling framework enables us to describe both the structure of the world in which individuals make environmental decisions (e.g., unknowable and unobservable factors and feedback loops) and some of the psychological processes underlying these decisions (sampling of information and mental models). The framework helps to understand how interactions of properties of the external world and processes in the mind lead to different environmentally relevant behaviors, and how different public policies might affect these interactions and the resulting behaviors.
Several properties of the environmental domain contribute to the prevalence of uncertainty. Research on how the climate is influenced by different greenhouse gases agrees that human influence is the major factor driving climate change (Cook et al., 2013) , but not all mechanisms of climate change have been fully explored so far, for example, regional effects (Intergovernmental Panel of Climate Change -IPCC, 2014) . The climate is a complex system whose behavior can change drastically as a result of only small changes in initial conditions (Lempert, 2002) . Information needed to model components of the system is partially lacking, and some important variables cannot be or have not yet been measured. Finally, every individual decision feeds back to the climate system and changes its underlying structure, so that one's model of climate change can become outdated. The presence of uncertainty has significant consequences for environmental decision making and public policy. It may lead to public reluctance to take actions needed to mitigate further climate change (Barrett & Dannenberg, 2014; Etkin & Ho, 2007) , even though higher uncertainty surrounding estimates of probability of global warming and associated costs actually calls for more rather than less intensive mitigating activity (Lewandowsky, Risbey, Smithson, Newell, & Hunter, 2014) .
A number of authors have put forward thoughtful and detailed classifications of risk and uncertainty in different domains, including medicine, cognitive science, financial, and environmental areas (e.g., Brighton & Gigerenzer, 2011; Lo & Mueller, 2010; Meder, Le Lec, & Osman, 2013; Spiegelhalter & Riesch, 2011; Walker et al., 2003; Wynne, 1992) . Reviewing all of these classifications is outside the scope of this paper, but we relate some of the most prominent examples to our proposed framework later on (Table 1) . These approaches have primarily aimed at helping scientists develop appropriate models of different phenomena ranging from cognition to financial markets to climate change, and communicate their findings to policy makers and other scientists. They are less concerned with how individuals in the general public are affected by the inherent uncertainty of their environment. To fill this gap, and at the same time avoid developing yet another completely new classification of uncertainty, we drew on an existing and well-studied statistical sampling framework and used it to build a framework for understanding and coping with uncertainty (Groves, 1989; Hansen, Hurwitz, & Madow, 1953; Kish, 1965) . The current treatment is aimed at uncertainty faced by individuals in the general public, but in the future it can be expanded to include uncertainties faced by other actors such as scientists, modelers, and policy makers.
The statistical sampling framework has been developed in the field of survey statistics to describe various sources of errors arising in the process of collecting and analyzing data about a target phenomenon. Many variants of the general framework have been developed, but for the purposes of this paper, we will use a condensed version including its most important elements, as shown in Fig. 1 . For instance, to make predictions about results of presidential elections, pollsters have to define a target population (e.g., all eligible voters who intend to vote), determine a sampling frame (e.g., phone book), take a sample (e.g., call randomly selected subset of sampling frame), and estimate the percentage of the target population that will vote for each candidate (e.g., by applying various model-based adjustments to the collected data). Errors can occur at each of these stages. The same framework applies to surveys that do not collect data about individuals but about businesses, agriculture, transportation, financial transactions, or the health system.
Elements of the statistical sampling framework have recently been used to describe how people form judgments about their physical and social environments (Denrell, 2005; Fiedler, 2000; Fiedler & Juslin, 2006; Galesic, Olsson, & Rieskamp, 2012; Juslin, Winman, & Hansson, 2007; Stewart, Chater, & Brown, 2006) . In this line of research, it has Brighton & Gigerenzer (2011) ; HKA, Han, Klein, and Arora (2011); LM, Lo & Mueller (2010) ; MLO, Meder et al. (2013) ; SR, Spiegelhalter and Riesch (2011) ; WY, Wynne (1992) ; WA, Walker et al. (2003). been recognized that the size and bias of samples people take from their environments influence their judgments and can explain a variety of apparent motivational and cognitive biases. However, other than providing these observations about the nature of people's samples, the statistical sampling framework has not yet been utilized to systematically discuss how people are affected by the inherent uncertainty of their changing worlds and how they can be helped to cope with it. The statistical sampling framework provides useful and well-developed concepts of errors and uncertainty that could fruitfully be used to illuminate environmental structures and psychological sampling processes involved, for example, when individuals make environmental decisions.
Sampling framework for understanding environmental uncertainty
The statistical sampling framework, shown in Fig. 1 , recognizes several layers of world structure as well as sampling and inference processes that affect survey inference. In Table 1 we connect parts of the framework with different other classifications of uncertainty mentioned above. Fig. 2 shows how the sampling framework applies to the environmental domain. In what follows, we describe each of the elements shown in Figs. 1 and 2 in more detail. Note that some elements of the sampling framework can be labeled "psychological" or happening "in the mind" (the sampling and modeling parts), but others are properties of the external world (characteristics of the target population and the sampling frame). In effect, the proposed framework bridges the gap between the mind and its environment by encompassing both the processes in the mind and environmental structure.
Target population
In the sampling framework, the part of the world that one is interested in is called the target population, represented in panel 1 of Fig. 1 Groves, 1989; Hansen et al., 1953; Kish, 1965) .
temperature, rainfall, wind systems, and other climate properties or events; as well as pollution indicators such as level of emissions of greenhouse gases, aerosols, and other pollutants in the atmosphere. They can also include social factors such as demographic and industrial trends in different countries, individual behaviors of one's neighbors, and prevailing social values and customs. All of these factors are related in a complex web of connections and feedback loops.
Sampling frame
The part of the world that can in principle be observed, that is, sampled and measured, is called the sampling frame. In surveys, this is the part of the population that is present on a list that can be sampled, such as a phone book or voting records, as represented by panel 2 in Fig. 1 . For various reasons, not everyone will be on such lists and therefore some will not have a chance to be sampled. Similarly, in the environmental domain many relevant factors cannot be observed and are not part of the sampling frame, such as past climate trends that were not recorded, current climate trends in parts of the world that are inaccessible to a given individual, hidden human activities such as an unknown release of poisonous materials, factors that affect the climate but are currently unknown, and various intricate interactions and feedback loops between various nonsocial and social factors influencing the environment. This is represented by a reduced number of factors, connections, and loops shown in panel 2 of Fig. 2. 
Sample
In surveys, as shown in panel 3 of Fig. 1 , the process of observation involves taking samples of people and measuring their behaviors or attitudes by means of instruments such as questionnaires and protocols. Similarly, depicted in panel 3 of Fig. 2 , people take samples from their sampling frame and observe the content of these samples directly or indirectly. Most often, people can sample only a small part of the sampling frame. Some people have larger samples, reflecting, for instance, more knowledge about the environmental domain or frequent experiences of extreme weather events, and some smaller. Furthermore, people are more likely to sample what is easily available in their immediate physical and social environments rather than take random samples from the overall sampling frames. For example, individuals living in colder and climatically more stable areas might not observe the extensive temperature and rainfall changes that individuals living in areas experiencing more frequent and larger changes do. Also, people know more about the environmentally relevant habits of their neighbors than about the habits of people and organizations they do not have regular contact with.
Models
In survey statistics, observations obtained by sampling are used to estimate sample properties and make inferences about the target population, as depicted in panel 4 of Fig. 1 . Similarly, as represented in panel 4 of Fig. 2 , individuals develop mental models of the phenomenon of interest, such as climate change, based on the samples they have taken from their physical and social environments. Mental models could describe relationships between different physical climate properties such as the amount of greenhouse gases and temperature, between physical and social factors such as global warming and people's consumption habits, or could be based on purely social factors such as perceived social norms regarding accepted environmentally relevant behaviors.
People use their mental models to determine appropriate behaviors, such as whether to recycle, reduce heating, or invest in biodegradable and energy-efficient products. Their resulting behavior feeds back to and continuously changes the phenomenon of interest. For instance, because of insufficient curbing of greenhouse gases, the increase in greenhouse emissions is steeper now than it was two decades ago. In turn, actions that are needed to reduce emissions to an acceptable level today are not the same as those that would have sufficed then (IPCC, 2013) .
Sources of uncertainty in the sampling framework
Having described different layers of the world within the sampling framework, we are now ready to map different sources of uncertainty onto the transitions between these layers. We build on error classification typically used in the survey sampling framework (Groves, 1989) , including errors due to imperfect sampling frames, samples, and estimation techniques, and integrate it with the different existing classifications of uncertainty mentioned above (see Table 1 ).
Coverage uncertainty
The first source of uncertainty occurs at the transition between the target population and the sampling frame, as shown in panels A of Figs. 1 and 2. This coverage uncertainty results from the difference between the set of all factors that influence the environment and the subset that can be observed, or the sampling frame. Even the best sampling frame will fail to include factors that cannot be observed, such as those that influence the climate but remain unknown, hidden behaviors of other people, complex interactions and feedback loops within the climate system, and future trends and events that cannot be anticipated. The resulting state-space ignorance affects people's judgments about probabilities and relative importance of different factors (Smithson, Bartos, & Takemura, 2000) . For instance, it has been shown that probabilities assigned to each of the known factors can depend on their number (partition dependence; Fox & Rottenstreich, 2003) . In principle, this source of uncertainty cannot be reduced by collecting more information about the known phenomena but only by discovering and/or controlling previously hidden or unknown factors or interactions influencing the environment. For example, current trends of climate change may be affected by factors or interactions that are not yet known (e.g., a pollutant that is not yet discovered), or by factors that in principle cannot be observed (e.g., climate-relevant events that happened a long time ago). In previous classifications of uncertainty, this source corresponds to concepts such as ignorance and indeterminacy (Table 1) .
Observation uncertainty
A second source of uncertainty stems from the difference between the sampling frame and samples that individuals take or have access to, as shown in panels B of Figs. 1 and 2. This observation uncertainty includes uncertainty due to sampling and measurement biases (epistemic uncertainty), and uncertainty due to random errors inherent in sampling and measurement (aleatory uncertainty or risk). Epistemic uncertainty due to sampling occurs when people's samples lack important data about the environment that are in principle observable. Because most people take convenience samples from the part of their nonsocial and social environments that they have access to, such as their local region and social circle, their samples will typically over-or underrepresent some parts of the sampling frame. Epistemic uncertainty due to measurement occurs when indicators used to describe target phenomenon do not reflect it well, for instance because of low validity or incommensurability (for an in-depth treatment of these and related measurement issues, see e.g., Shadish, Cook, & Campbell, 2001 ). In the previous classifications, this source of uncertainty has been called reducible ignorance and reducible uncertainty (Table 1) .
Aleatory uncertainty occurs because of sampling variability and measurement error. Sampling variability is a function of sample size and variability in the phenomenon of interest-it will be larger for individuals whose samples are smaller, and for phenomena that are more variable (e.g., regional levels of rainfall vs. daily temperature cycles). Measurement error occurs because of unreliable measures and because of inherent inability of exact measurement of many natural phenomena. This latter uncertainty about initial conditions can prevent predictability of climate systems even when they are fully deterministic. Aleatory uncertainty can typically be well described in terms of probability distributions. In other classifications it has often been labeled risk or probability (Table 1) .
Modeling uncertainty
A third source of uncertainty occurs at the transition between samples and models, shown in panels C of Figs. 1 and 2. Based on nonsocial and social information taken from their samples, people make models of the target phenomenon (Pidgeon & Fischhoff, 2011) . For example, a climate scientist may make a model of global temperature increase in the next decade based on a sample of climate indicators as well as scientific predictions about imminent technological and political changes. Similarly, an individual may make a mental model of the usefulness of recycling behavior based on what she reads about it in the media, or on what she observes her neighbors doing. Modeling uncertainty stems from often conflicting goals of fitting and prediction accuracy of a model. In particular, models that precisely describe past data may not be too successful in predicting the phenomenon of interest in the future (Marewski, Gaissmaier, & Gigerenzer, 2010) . Increased complexity makes a model more likely to overfit data (i.e., to capture not only the variance due to the variables of interest, but also that from random error), whereas its generalizability to new data decreases. This is so in particular when some of the influencing factors and interactions remain unknown or the phenomenon is changing over time, as well as when one's samples are small and/or biased. At the same time, decreasing a model's complexity can eventually lead to underfitting; thus, in an uncertain world, there is typically an inversely U-shaped function between complexity and predictive power (see Pitt, Myung, & Zhang, 2002) . Similarly, people's mental models may over-or underestimate the importance of different factors, combine factors in inappropriate ways, and assume wrong causal and structural relationships between the factors, as well as between the factors and the target phenomenon. In other classifications of uncertainty, developed mostly for scientific models, this source of uncertainty has been called misspecification and uncertainty about model structure (Table 1) .
Implications of the sampling framework for public policy strategies in the environmental domain
Individual behavior, in particular transportation, household energy use, waste production, and food choices, contributes to a significant portion of greenhouse gas emissions (Brewer & Stern, 2005; Dietz, Gardner, Gilligan, Stern, & Vandenbergh, 2009 ). Therefore, a number of different public policy strategies have been proposed and used to motivate the general public to engage in more environmentally friendly behaviors (Wilson & Dowlatabadi, 2007) . What public policy strategies are best suited to help the general public cope with the uncertainty that burdens their environmental decisions? We propose that each of the sources of uncertainty described above is best addressed by a different public policy strategy. As Fig. 2 indicates, research and regulations may be the best way to decrease coverage uncertainty; increasing environmental literacy can help cope with observation uncertainty; and efforts aimed at improving mental models could help with modeling uncertainty. In what follows we describe each of the strategies in more detail. While these different strategies are sometimes described as contradictory (Bond, 2009), we believe that each of them has a place and a complementary role in coping with uncertainty.
Research, visibility, and adaptation for coping with coverage uncertainty
Coverage uncertainty is perhaps the most challenging source of uncertainty because here we "don't know what we don't know." However, the presence of this uncertainty does not mean that we need to admit intellectual defeat (Lo & Mueller, 2010) . Instead, policy makers can help individuals cope with it, as depicted in panel I of Fig. 2 . They could promote further investment in scientific research about factors influencing climate change, as this will almost certainly reduce the part of the world that we do not yet understand (e.g., local effects of climate change, such as the rate of decrease of the Antarctic ice sheet since 1992; IPCC, 2014). In addition, policy makers can prepare the general public for prevention and, if needed, adaptation to possible but unpredictable adverse consequences of climate change, such as extreme weather events (Stern, 2007) .
Increasing environmental literacy for coping with observation uncertainty
In principle, both epistemic and aleatory kinds of observation uncertainty can be reduced by collecting larger and more representative samples of information about climate change and observing environmentally relevant events with greater accuracy. For example, individuals who lack the experience of extreme weather events could reduce their observation uncertainty by accessing information about other regions in the world where those take place. To help individuals cope with observation uncertainty, policy makers can implement programs to increase the environmental literacy of the general public and to communicate irreducible aleatory uncertainties, as depicted in panel II of Fig. 2 .
Various educational programs have been developed to increase people's environmental literacy by educating them about the technological and social facts related to the causes and consequences of climate change, the role of human activities, and the usefulness of different approaches to reducing greenhouse emissions. Three examples can illustrate such educational efforts. First, for making individuals more "climate science literate," an initiative by the U.S. Global Change Research Program, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, the American Association for the Advancement of Science, and others (2009) summarized basic knowledge on climate, for example, general climate processes, the role of carbon, and basic ideas and methodological approaches in climate science. The guiding principle is to motivate informed decisions among citizens and to enable them to take action against anthropogenic climate change. Similarly, the European Union recently launched the European Climate Adaptation Platform, which contains general climate knowledge as well as reports on local adaptation activities. Second, large misperceptions exist about the effectiveness of single actions (Attari, DeKay, Davidson, & Bruine de Bruin, 2010) in that individuals tend to overestimate the emissions impact of everyday regular activities (like turning off lights) and underestimate those of one-shot efficiency actions (like replacement of old light bulbs with more efficient ones). Governments, nongovernmental organizations, and companies try to correct such knowledge by providing, for example, online calculators where people can compare their individual carbon emissions across various domains of daily life with a local average and track it over time. These calculations are often followed by personalized recommendations for reducing emissions. Finally, revealing otherwise hidden information to individuals that is relevant for their decisions about environmental behaviors can be effective as well. Examples receiving empirical support are displays of air pollution in busy traffic areas, and informing people about energy consumption in their neighborhoods (Cialdini, Reno, & Kallgren, 1990; Marcell, Agyeman, & Rappaport, 2004) .
A number of recommendations have been developed for communicating aleatory uncertainty, but some studies suggest that certain approaches, such as ranges, may backfire and decrease credibility of health information (Longman, Turner, King, & McCaffery, 2012) . However, in the case of weather forecasts, probabilistic (instead of deterministic) estimates led to more trust in the information and better decisions overall (Joslyn & LeClerc, 2012; see Stephens, Edwards, & Demeritt, 2012 , for a review). For the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) reports, guidelines had been formulated for expressing various degrees of uncertainty (Kandlikar, Risbey, & Dessai, 2005; Mastrandrea et al., 2010) , and scientists have been encouraged to express the degree of confidence in their conclusions as well as, when possible, to specify likelihoods for specific outcomes. In general, laypeople's interpretations of likelihoods as used in the IPCC reports are most precise when verbal labels of probabilities are accompanied by precise numerical information in order to avoid interpretations that regress to the mean or are substantially biased by attitudes or general belief in climate change (Budescu, Por, Broomell, & Smithson, 2014) . In addition to verbal and numerical expressions of aleatory uncertainty, graphs play a central role as they can improve people's understanding of quantitative information (Ibrekk & Morgan, 1987; Lewandowsky, 2011; Spiegelhalter, Pearson, & Short, 2011) . Graphical displays need to be tailored to an audience's needs and different kinds of graphs are advantageous for different kinds of information (Shah, Freedman, & Vekiri, 2006) . However, empirical evidence on the usefulness of graphical displays of aleatory uncertainty is still limited.
Finally, it is important to communicate to the general public the level of scientific consensus on climate change. Recent evidence shows that suspicion among laypeople about the scientific consensus is still high (Leiserowitz et al., 2013; Maibach, Myers, & Leiserowitz, 2014) . However, perceived consensus, not only in climate change but across various scientific fields, seems to be a central factor for making information more credible and reducing the influence of individual political backgrounds and ideologies (Lewandowsky, Gignac, & Vaughan, 2012).
Improving mental models for coping with modeling uncertainty
Appropriate mental models are essential for understanding risk and uncertainty (Bruine de Bruin & Bostrom, 2013; Morgan, Fischhoff, Bostrom, & Atman, 2002) , for understanding the significance of climate change (Nisbet, 2009) , and for coping with everyday problems in general (Gentner, 2002) . Even the highest level of environmental literacy does not preclude the possibility that one's mental model of the causes and consequences of climate change is wrong (Kahan et al., 2012) . For instance, Sterman (2008) has shown that many people, even those with high sophistication in science and technology, misperceive the climate as a relatively simple system where an action immediately produces results, rather than a complex dynamical system where an action may have delayed or unpredicted consequences. Explaining the climate through an analogy of a bathtub, where in order to keep the level of water constant the inflow of water needs to equal the outflow, can make it more understandable. Similarly, Kempton (1986) found that wrong mental models of how thermostats work lead to substantially higher energy spending.
How can inadequate mental models be changed? Several public policy strategies can be helpful, indicated in panel III of Fig. 2 . One promising way is through the use of analogies, as described above. Analogies have long been used in science education to explain a wide range of concepts (Oppenheimer, 1956) . The challenge of future research is to find the right analogies to communicate the concepts related to climate change to the general public.
Another way to help people use better models is by teaching them simple rules of thumb, or heuristics, that can help them to form mental models that allow them to evaluate whether an action is environmentally friendly. One such rule could be to evaluate whether a product causes relatively low or high greenhouse gases by whether it is regional or not. Whereas this rule will not always be correct, it is "good enough" to be useful and can be readily used to guide everyday behavior.
Simple rules echo the robust adaptive decision-making approaches used by experts (Walker, Lempert, & Kwakkel, 2013) , who do not seek the optimal solution but rather the solution that is the most robust under a wide range of possible future scenarios and adaptive to unforeseeable changes in events. Similarly, in the area of individual decision making it has been recognized that heuristics can be as good as or better than more complex models such as optimal weighting when it comes to predicting outcomes in novel situations (Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011) . The general idea behind these approaches is that in noisy, uncertain environments, only part of the available information generalizes to the future. The art of building a good model is to find this part and ignore the rest. The more noise in the environment, the more complex models with many free parameters tend to overfit, that is, reflect the noise in a specific sample. Simplicity can reduce overfitting and thereby produce robust decision strategies. Simple models such as heuristics can therefore actually be superior to more complex models in predictions under uncertainty (for concrete demonstrations and more theoretical explanations, see Gigerenzer & Brighton, 2009) . Consequently, simple rules could be the most effective way to cope with modeling uncertainty.
The same properties that make simple rules valuable in mental model also make them attractive to policy makers. For example, they can promote simple prescriptive rules such as "save water," "buy green energy," or "purchase a fuel-efficient vehicle" (Gardner & Stern, 2008) . These rules can be promoted in three different ways. First, they can be taught to the general public who can then choose for themselves whether to follow these rules in their daily life (e.g., Matulka, 2014) . Second, the rules can be imposed through governmental regulation, for example, through legal restrictions on vehicle emissions (EPA [United States Environmental Protection Agency], 2014). Finally, various ways to construct wise environments could be used to steer or nudge people toward following those rules, for example, through environmentally friendly defaults (Pichert & Katsikopoulos, 2008) . Which of these strategies is ethically most appropriate depends on the evidence about the usefulness of simple rules, and agreement that a particular rule leads to improved outcomes for both individuals and the society (Bodemer & Feufel, 2012) . There exists by now a large scientifically sound range of facts about anthropogenic influences on climate change (IPCC, 2014) . That these facts are documented, however, does not mean that straightforward policy decisions are a given. First, in light of scientific uncertainties it becomes difficult to make normative judgments about what, exactly, the impact of global climate change looks like or what amount of greenhouse gases actually leads to a lower particular risk. Second, evaluations of what consequences of global climate change are "unacceptable" might differ between different key risks. Third, coping strategies and policy decisions do not depend on scientific evidence alone but also on economic, social, and ethical considerations that might vary according to the vulnerability of a particular group of people (Reisinger & Larsen, 2007 ). An estimate of how and when education, rules, and/or nudging are deemed appropriate for implementing adaptation and mitigation behavior depends thus on how the costs and consequences of climate change are evaluated by local decision makers.
Discussion
We have developed a framework for understanding different sources of uncertainty that burden individuals' decisions about environmentally appropriate behaviors. Our framework is different from previous classifications in several ways. First, it enables understanding of both the structure of the world in which environmental decisions are made and the processes in the mind underlying these decisions. It furthermore enables studying how interactions of the external world and the mind lead to different environmentally relevant behaviors. Second, it integrates existing classifications of uncertainty within the classic statistical sampling framework, providing a way to compare different previous classifications. Third, the same framework can be used to analyze uncertainties in different domains, such as finance or medicine, as well as to understand uncertainties in both lay individual and expert decision making. Finally, our framework has clear implications for public policy, suggesting how a combination of different approaches can be used to help the general public cope with uncertainty related to climate change.
The present framework helps to recognize that some well-known aspects of uncertainty may influence several locations in the sampling framework. Consequently, coping with them may require a combination of policy actions. For instance, prior beliefs as well as conflicting information may affect choice of the sample as well as models based on the sample. Even when samples are good, prior beliefs can distort the inferences based on them as some information that is sampled may be underweighted. And vice versa, the best models can hardly compensate for biased samples that result from not even collecting information from sources that one a priori disagrees with. Helping people to cope with these influences may therefore need to involve both increasing environmental literacy and improving their mental models.
The framework vividly demonstrates that samples that are available for developing models are but a small and often biased part of the larger set of factors that is important for explaining the phenomenon of interest. More precisely, the samples are only a small part of the sampling frame, which in turn includes only the currently known and observable parts of the overall target population. This suggests the need for caution when trying to evaluate models solely by how well they fit the available data rather than by how well they predict the actual phenomenon of interest. It also suggests that collecting a large amount of data about known factors (that is, reducing observation uncertainty) cannot fully compensate for the uncertainties originating from unknown factors (that is, coverage uncertainty).
In contrast to most previous classifications of uncertainty that focus on expert decision making, the present framework has been developed specifically to illuminate uncertainties present in lay individuals' decision making about environmental behaviors. However, the framework can be easily adjusted and used to distinguish sources of uncertainty relevant for expert decisions and to recommend specific strategies experts can use to cope with the uncertainty. For instance, to cope with modeling uncertainty, experts can use a range of methodological techniques such as cross-validation, bias-variance analysis, ensemble algorithms, and scenario analyses.
Further avenues for developing the framework include relating it to lay notions of different types of uncertainty (e.g., unforeseen threat vs. opportunity for exploration and discovery; Smithson, 2008) , as well as incorporating some potentially relevant aspects of a Bayesian framework such as updating processes and related concepts. Note also that the list of public policy strategies we proposed is by no means exhaustive. It is meant to illustrate that different strategies are effective for coping with different sources of uncertainty. Our framework is an idealized portrait of the real world, but we believe that it can be a useful guideline for developing public policy strategies in the environmental domain.
